The release of detailed taxi trips has motivated numerous useful studies, but has also triggered multiple privacy attacks on individuals' trips. Despite these attacks, no tools are available for systematically analyzing the privacy risk of released trajectory data. While, recent studies have proposed mechanisms to publish synthetic mobility data with provable privacy guarantees, the questions on -1) how to explain the theoretical privacy guarantee to non-privacy experts; and 2) how well private data preserves the properties of ground truth, remain unclear. To address these issues, we propose a system -VisDPT that provides rich visualization of sensitive information in trajectory databases and helps data curators understand the impact on utility due to privacy preserving mechanisms. We believe VisDPT will enable data curators to take informed decisions while publishing sanitized data.
INTRODUCTION
Billions of detailed anonymized taxi trips for big cities such as New York and Beijing, have been made publicly available. These have fueled a number of studies on human mobility patterns for a variety of applications such as traffic planning and road constructions [6, 11, 14, 15, 16] . However, privacy concerns over these datasets [7, 10, 12, 13] have motivated multiple attempts to identify passengers, or to learn their sensitive information from these datasets. For example, publication of NYC Taxi data 1 , leads to the release of sensitive information such as trips of celebrities and home addresses of frequent visitors of night clubs [10] . A study on GPS data of taxis in Beijing concluded that passengers' privacy can be exposed by re-identifying more than 55% of trajectories using origin and destination queries [13] .
Despite increasing privacy awareness among data curators, the translation of the above attacks to a systematic and thorough privacy evaluation tool is a nontrivial task for data curators who are not experts in privacy. Geolocation analysis tools such as GEPETO [7, 8] have been designed to enhance visual exploration of data and help evaluate inference attacks on large data. However, this exploration process requires manual, incremental, and repeated efforts until suspicious trips are identified. Moreover, privacy claims that are not supported by standard privacy evaluation metrics can be inconsistent and biased, since they are sensitive to factors such as quality and quantity of data, and background knowledge of the adversary. Recent studies on publishing synthetic mobility data [9] with provable privacy guarantees namely differential privacy [5] -provides an orthogonal solution to the privacy attacks. However, the theoretical privacy guarantee and the effectiveness of preserving utility of the synthetic data are not trivial to understand.
To tackle these challenges, we present VisDPT -a web based visual exploration tool that helps data curators understand the privacy risks involved in publishing their data. VisDPT also enables data curators to understand the quality of data processed by sanitizing mechanisms. Through VisDPT, we make the following contributions:
1. An end-to-end system for generating a database of synthetic trajectories that incorporates our recent work Differentially Private Trajectories (DPT) [9] , which was presented at VLDB 2015. DPT generates synthetic trajectories that have similar aggregate properties as the original trajectories, while ensuring differential privacy.
2. A class of privacy metrics to allow comprehensive examination of privacy risks of both raw and synthetic trajectories without writing repeated low-level queries.
3. An interactive visualization of a rich set of utility queries that are commonly used in mobility data analysis, such as origin-destination queries and frequent pattern queries.
People who are not privacy experts can use VisDPT to gain insights on how and to what extent the sensitive information is protected in a differentially private output. At the same time, privacy experts can explore the impact of noise on the utility of the perturbed dataset with VisDPT. To make the experience of attendees interesting and engaging, we design our demo in the form of games. In particular, the demo involves a privacy game and a utility game. The privacy game allows attendees to perceive the amount of sensitive information protected by differential privacy via visual comparisons between a non-private output and a private output over various queries. The utility game helps attendees learn the impact of differentially private mechanisms on aggregate properties by visually inspecting utility query results under different levels of privacy guarantee. We believe VisDPT will enhance data curators' understanding of differentially private trajectories and encourage them to release properly sanitized trajectories for studies on human mobility in the future.
BACKGROUND
Given a spatial domain Σ, a regular trajectory t is a sequence of locations (σi) observed and recorded at regular time intervals, where σi ∈ Σ for i = 1, 2, . . .. The spatial domain is usually a set of latitude-longitude coordinates. We consider a trajectory database D consisting of |D| individuals. We denote the input to our system by Draw which is the ground truth. This ground truth usually inherits high uniqueness of individuals even at coarser temporal and spatial resolutions [4] . This means that an adversary can easily identify Alice from an anonymized database based on few locations she visited, as these locations do not appear in other individual's trajectories. We generalize this notion of uniqueness and define a class of privacy metrics such that data curator can visually explore the potential privacy risk on the raw trajectories Draw with minimal effort. Furthermore, the curator can release a modified or synthetic version of Draw which has no real individuals. However, the absence of real individuals in the synthetic data does not necessarily guarantee privacy. Hence, we extend the privacy metrics of the ground truth data Draw to synthetic data Dsyn which can be useful to evaluate various privacy mechanisms.
The privacy guarantee demonstrated in our system is differential privacy [5] , which is a de-facto standard for protection of an individual's sensitive information. The compelling guarantee allows statistical indistinguishability (governed by a privacy parameter ) of the output with or without any individual's presence in the database. Formally, we define -differential privacy in the context of trajectory databases as follows. Let D1, D2 be two neighboring trajectory databases, i.e., D1 and D2 differ in only one individual's trajectory t, written as D1 − D2 = 1. A randomized mechanism M satisfies -differential privacy (DP), if for any possible output
holds. In other words, the adversary cannot infer whether or not the individual's trajectory is present in the database from the output distribution generated by M (the released information) with high probability, where this probability depends on the privacy parameter . Usually, larger implies more disclosure about any single individual, but better accuracy on the released information.
Despite of many appealing properties of differential privacy, its theoretical guarantee is not trivial to understand. Hence, VisDPT incorporates our recent work on Differentially Private Trajectories (DPT) [9] to illustrate this privacy guarantee over trajectory databases. DPT is an endto-end framework which takes Draw as an input, and outputs a database of synthetic trajectories, with -differential privacy guarantee. This framework can be summarized as follows. First, DPT builds a probabilistic hierarchical reference system model from the raw database. This model is then perturbed into an -differentially private model with optimal amount of Laplace noise. Lastly, DPT samples private synthetic trajectories from the perturbed model. Due to space constraints, we refer readers to the paper [9] for details. For Figure 1 : Outline of VisDPT framework this demo, VisDPT will take the synthetic databases generated by DPT to show the difference between differentially private and non-differentially private trajectory databases, and the trade-off between privacy and utility using in the context of trajectories. Figure 1 shows the outline of VisDPT system which consists of four modules -1) model generation, 2) sampling, 3) query processing, and 4) visualization. Given a database of taxi trips Draw, VisDPT builds a probabilistic model H and sanitizes it to generate a private modelH with a given privacy budget . The sampling phase uses H andH to generate synthetic trajectories Dsyn and private trajectories D syn respectively. In this work, we use the mechanism proposed in our prior work DPT [9] for modeling and sampling trajectories. However, our framework can be easily extended to support multiple modeling and sampling techniques to compare their accuracy and privacy guarantee. The query processing module can execute various privacy and utility queries (e.g., finding unique trajectories, calculating trip distribution, etc.) on original as well as sampled databases. The results of these queries are presented by the visualization module which displays quantitative results (such as statistics and graphs) together with three different map views (one for each database). The map views help users visually inspect and compare the results by overlaying output trips or distribution. Next, we explain the privacy and utility queries supported in our first version of VisDPT.
OVERVIEW OF VisDPT

Privacy Metrics
The notion of "uniqueness" has been developed as one of the privacy risk assessments on raw trajectory database [4] . The test based on this notion approximates the number of points required to uniquely identify the trajectory of an individual. However, synthetic data built from the raw database has no real individuals and hence the re-identifying test on the ground truth may not be directly applicable for the synthetic data. Therefore, we first develop a class of privacy metrics for raw trajectory database, and extend these metrics to synthetic database.
Metrics for Raw Database. The vulnerability of Draw to re-identification attacks and the uniqueness of a trajectory can be well reflected by this class of privacy metrics. Each privacy metric is associated with a similarity function, denoted by It(t ) for t, t ∈ Draw which outputs 0 if t is similar to t, otherwise it outputs 1. The uniqueness of a trajectory t ∈ Draw depends on the set of trajectories similar to t in Draw, denoted by St = {t ∈ Draw|It(t ) = 0}. We say t is unique if |St| = 1, i.e., St only contains t itself. We denote the set of unique trajectories in Draw by TI (Draw). Then, the vulnerability of a raw database Draw to re-identification attacks is defined as the fraction of unique trajectories in the raw database. Instances of this class of privacy metrics using two types of similarity functions are presented below.
Point based similarity. The point based similarity I p,θ t (t ) computes the similarity between trajectories based on the similarity of locations at fixed p positions. Let {σ1, . . . , σp} ⊂ t and σ 1 , . . . , σ p ⊂ t , are locations at p positions in respective trajectories. Then, I p,θ t (t ) = 0, if all these p pairs of points are within distance θ, i.e., ||σi − σ i ||2 < θ ∀i = 1, . . . , p, otherwise it is 1.
Distance based similarity. The distance based similarity I d,θ t (t ) computes the similarity between trajectories using a given distance function d(·, ·). Examples of such distance functions are edit distance [3] and Fréchet distance [2] . We say I d,θ t (t ) = 0, if d(t, t ) < θ, otherwise it is 1. Metrics for Synthetic Database. From the privacy perspective, the synthetic dataset should not have any trajectories that can be exploited for re-identification attacks. One class of such trajectories are the ones that are similar to the unique trajectories in the raw database, i.e., TI (Draw). The set of such trajectories in the synthetic dataset, TI (Dsyn), is computed as follows. For each t ∈ TI (Draw), we compute the set of trajectories in Dsyn that are similar to t. We denote this set as SI t (Dsyn) = {t ∈ Dsyn|It(t ) = 0}. Then, TI (Dsyn) = ∪ t∈T I (Draw) SI t (Dsyn). It is important to know how similar these trajectories are to the unique trajectories. Hence, for all trajectories TI (Dsyn) we compute the distribution of similarity (with the corresponding unique trajectories in the raw database) using a distance function d(·, ·) mentioned above.
Utility Metrics
VisDPT presents a rich class of utility metrics for popular taxi data analysis, such as patterns [14] , paths taken by taxi [15, 16] and trip distribution [6, 11] .
Diameter. The diameter for a trajectory t = (σ1, . . . , σn) is the maximum Euclidean distance between any pair of locations in t, i.e., maxi,j d(σi, σj) ∀i, j = 1, ..., n. Q d (D) denotes the empirical distribution of the diameter on the trajectory database D.
For rest of the queries, we map all trajectories onto a uniform grid Σv with resolution v and compute the distribution at a cell level, to handle the sparsity issue of databases. For every trajectory t = (σ1, . . . , σn) in D, we find the mapped sequence of cells (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Σ n v , where σi ∈ ci, i.e., location σi is in the cell ci.
Origin/Destination. Given a uniform grid Σv, the origin distribution Qs(D, v) denotes the empirical distribution of the starting points of D over Σv. The destination distribution Qe(D, v) is defined similarly for the ending points of trajectories in D.
Trip/Path. Trip distribution measures the distribution of ending points of trajectories over Σv that are originating from a given cell cs ∈ Σv, denoted by Qt(D, cs). The path query Qp(D, cs, ce) denotes the set of trajectories starting at cs and ending in ce. 
DEMONSTRATION OVERVIEW
In this demo, we expect the attendees to gain insights on -1) how and to what extent the sensitive information (such as unique trajectories) is protected in a differentially private output; and 2) the impact of noise on the utility of the perturbed dataset. The dashboard for the demo comprises of a control panel (left) and a viewing area (right) as shown in Figure 2 . The control panel allows users to select samples from databases (Draw, Dsyn and D syn ) and to perform various analysis on these databases. The results are displayed in three different map windows (one for each database) in the viewing area. Each map window displays a visualization of the query result such as heat maps or trajectory paths and allows operations such as point selection. The overall quantitative results (e.g., statistics, graphs, etc.) will be displayed below for various values. The attendee can select value, to change the view for the third window with the corresponding database (D syn ).
For the purpose of this demo, we use a dataset of approximately 4.3 million taxi trips recorded by 8602 taxi cabs in Beijing, China, during May 2009 [1] . The trajectories cover the region of Beijing within the bounding box (39.788N, 116.148W) and (40.093N, 116.612W) -approximately 34 km × 40 km. The raw sampling rate of these trajectories ranges from 30 seconds to 5 minutes. In the interest of time, we precompute all synthetic databases and queries for the demo. The demo comprises of two tasks designed as games that can be played by the attendees. First, we explain them the aim of the game followed by a quick demonstration of how to play (and win) the game. Then, Figure 3 : Privacy Game: guess DP model the attendees are given a chance to explore the system via these games as described below.
Privacy Game. This game aims to differentiate private results from non-private results based on the existence of unique trajectories. The demonstrators will first show how to explore unique trajectories in the ground truth Draw by selecting one of the privacy metrics and adjusting the corresponding threshold θ for its similarity function. Corresponding unique trajectories will be displayed on the first window. Next, demonstrator will select one of the displayed unique trajectories by clicking on it. The other two windows will show synthetic trajectories in Dsyn and D syn (fixed ) which are close to the selected trajectory (i.e., having distance < θ) and their corresponding similarity (distance) values. The attendee will observe that the differentially private model is unlikely to output trajectories similar to any unique trajectories in the ground truth, while non-perturbed output preserves unique trajectories.
After this learning, the attendee will be shown three windows (Figure 3) , where the first window displays trajectories in Draw, but the positions of the other two windows for Dsyn and D syn are at random and are unknown to the attendee. His goal is to guess which window (results) are from D syn by querying on the three databases. If he chooses the correct window then he wins, otherwise, the window positions are shuffled and he retries. We measure the number of attempts in terms of the number of queries made by an attendee on Draw which includes adjustment of θ and selection of a trajectory. One can think of this information as the background information available to the attendee to achieve the goal.
Utility Game. The aim of this game is to provide deeper understanding of the trade-off between the aggregate utility of synthetic databases and privacy budget in differential privacy. The demonstrators will select the utility query in the control panel and the results are visualized on the corresponding three windows accompanied by an error plot of queries over D syn w.r.t to Draw for different . Sliding bar for can be adjusted to explain the relationship between query outputs and -smaller yields poor utility.
The attendee will be shown three windows in this game (Figure 4 In summary, the demo of VisDPT will allow attendees to see the effectiveness of differential private trajectories on their privacy and utility guarantees. We hope that Vis-DPT will be a useful tool for data curators to make informed decisions, and hence encourage the release of properly sanitized trajectories for studies on human mobility in the future.
